Loading...

End-to-end encryption

The server cannot read it.

Watch a sealed session: Officer A writes plaintext, the server only ever sees ciphertext, Officer B opens it. Signal-protocol-class. Your keys. Zero plaintext in the middle.

AES-256-GCM On the wire
0 Plaintext on server
X3DH First handshake
Ratchet Every message after
ZYROBYTE VAULT End-to-end session
X3DH Double Ratchet AES-256-GCM
sealed
Ratchet384
Sealed1284
Plaintext on server0
Keys in HSM2
Officer A · device

Post clear. ALPHA-1.

plaintext here only
Server waiting… cannot decrypt
Officer B · device

Post clear. ALPHA-1.

plaintext here only

Session log

server sees ciphertext

Related floors

Need the radios and the command floor this encryption rides on?

Security communications

The contract

If we can decrypt it later, we failed.

What E2E actually means

Only the endpoints can read the plaintext. The server, the carrier, and we cannot. If a vendor can “recover” a message for you, it was not end-to-end.

Signal-class, not a consumer app

We ship the same family of protocol Signal and WhatsApp use: X3DH for the first handshake, Double Ratchet for every message after. Proven primitives. Your radios and your floor — not a public app store product.

Your keys

Identity keys live on issued devices or in an HSM you control. We operate the infrastructure. We do not keep a master key. A seized server is a pile of ciphertext.

A custom protocol is a program

Some buyers must own the spec. We will write a session protocol on AES-GCM, X25519, and a ratchet you can take to a lab. That is not “better math than Signal.” It is a stack you can audit, fork, and keep when the contract ends.

The real floor

AI does not brute-force AES. It phishes the officer.

That is the honest pitch. We encrypt the path with a protocol a lab will recognize, and we harden the device the path ends on.

What AI actually changes

Phishing. Voice clones. Malware on the handset. Traffic analysis. Stolen endpoints. That is the new floor. Brute-forcing AES-256 or X25519 is not. Anyone selling “AI-proof AES” is selling a story.

Harden the device

E2E is only as strong as the phone it runs on. We scope lock-down, remote wipe, and a revoke when a radio is lost. The protocol cannot save a compromised endpoint.

Metadata is the leak

Who talked to whom, when, and for how long often matters more than the words. We minimize what the server must see. Sealed sender and padding where the threat model requires it.

Jurisdiction

Your keys in your country. Your servers where the law says they must sit. A consumer app cannot promise that. A program can.

What we build

Messenger, radio, keys, or a spec you own

Two rugged phones with a sealed cyan channel between them

E2E messenger

1:1 and groups where the server stores ciphertext. Signal-protocol-class session keys (X3DH + Double Ratchet). Your app, your devices, your audit.

from $10,000 CAD

Start E2E messenger
Rugged 4G push-to-talk handset with a cyan status LED

E2E voice & radio

The same class of protocol on a PTT path and on a call. The floor can still dispatch. The server cannot listen.

from $15,000 CAD

Start E2E voice & radio
Hardware security module with a cyan LED and sealed key cards on a steel table

Key custody

You hold the identity keys. On-prem or HSM. We never keep a copy that can decrypt tomorrow’s traffic. Rotation, device revoke, and a ceremony you can audit.

from $8,000 CAD

Start Key custody
Close-up of a rack switch with a cyan-lit fiber patch

Custom session protocol

When a ministry will not run a consumer stack. We design the session layer on standard primitives — your identity, your ratchets, your review. Not a secret cipher. A spec you own.

from $25,000 CAD

Start Custom session protocol

How we work

Name the adversary. Then pick the class.

1

Name the threat

Carrier, cloud admin, seized server, lost radio, or a hostile update. The protocol follows the adversary — not a feature list.

2

Pick the class

Signal-protocol-class on your app, or a custom session spec with a review. Most programs start with the former. Ministries sometimes need the latter.

3

Hold the keys

Ceremony, HSM or device-bound identity, rotation, revoke. If we can decrypt it later, we failed the engagement.

4

Put it on the radio

Messenger, PTT, files. Same identity. The security-communications floor talks. This page makes sure the path cannot be read.

Questions

Before a key is issued

Is this better than Signal?

Signal is excellent consumer E2E. This is not a consumer app. We put that class of protocol on issued radios and a command floor you own — your keys, your servers, your audit, your jurisdiction. A custom session protocol is for when you must control the spec, not because we claim a stronger cipher.

Does AI make encryption easy to brute-force?

No. Properly implemented modern ciphers (AES-256, X25519, a Double Ratchet) are not brute-forced by AI. The rise in AI changes endpoints and social engineering: cloned voices, phishing, malware on the handset. We encrypt the path and we harden the device. “AI-proof AES” is a story. We do not tell it.

Telegram or Signal as a base?

Telegram’s cloud chats are not E2E. Signal’s protocol is. We ship Signal-protocol-class sessions in your product. We do not resell Telegram. If you want a custom spec later, that is the custom-protocol engagement — designed, reviewed, and yours.

Can you write a custom protocol?

Yes, as a program. Standard primitives, a session layer you own, a written spec, and a review path. Custom crypto that “beats Signal” by inventing a cipher is how systems fail. We will not sell that. We will sell a stack you can take to a lab.

Will you have a backdoor?

No. If a government or a client requires recoverable plaintext on the server, that is not this page — that is ordinary TLS and a hosted archive. E2E means we cannot read it. The FAQ is the contract.

How is this priced?

Starting prices in CAD for a scoped production slice. Key custody from $8,000. E2E messenger from $10,000. E2E voice and radio from $15,000. Custom session protocol from $25,000. Radios and the command floor are quoted on Security Communications.

Ready to seal the path?

A messenger, a radio, or a spec you own?

Tell us who holds the keys, who is allowed to decrypt, and whether a seized server must be useless. We will propose the protocol class and the engagement around that.

Top